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REAL ESTATE BROKERS: THE PROCURING CAUSE
AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, where the transaction which a real
estate broker was employed to negotiate is consummated, he is
entitled to his commission if, and only if, he is the procuring cause
of that transaction.'
While the Illinois courts have consistently followed this rule,
they have not always used the same terminology when doing so.
Thus, Illinois courts have held that a broker is entitled to his com-
mission when he is the "procuring cause of the sale,"2 when he is
the "proximate cause of the sale, ' 3 when he has "procured a buyer
ready, able and willing to purchase on terms proposed by the
owner,"4 and when he has "presented to his employer a purchaser
who enters into a valid, binding and enforceable contract with his
employer." 5
It is the purpose of this section to examine the meaning of
the term "procuring cause" as it relates to the real estate broker's
right to a commission, and to determine under what conditions
the Illinois courts will hold that a real estate broker is the procur-
ing cause. The question as to whether the broker operated under
a valid contract of employment, while essential in determining his
right to a commission, is omitted from this section, since it is dealt
with elsewhere in this symposium.6
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The methods which might be employed by a broker attempt-
ing to bring about the sale of real estate, of course, are many.
Therefore, each case creates a new question of fact for the jury, and
the jury's decision as to whether or not a broker was the procuring
cause of a sale will not be disturbed on review, unless clearly
against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the Illinois
1 5 I.L.P., Brokers § 79 (1953).
2 Doss v. Kirk, 8 Ill. App. 2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49 (3d Dist. 1956).
3 Waghorne v. Hogstrom, 11 Ill. App. 2d 345, 137 N.E.2d 497 (2d Dist. 1956);
Murawaka v. Boeger, 219 Ill. App. 241 (1st Dist. 1920); Baumgartl v. Hoyne, 54 Ill. App.
497 (1st Dist. 1894).
4 Monroe v. Snow, 131 Ill. 126, 23 N.E. 401 (1890).
5 Wilson v. Mason, 158 Ill. 304, 42 N.E. 134 (1895).
6 See § 1, Licenses, Regulation and Employment of Brokers, at n.26 et seq.
7 Read v. Tate, 20 Ill. App. 2d 147, 155 N.E.2d 377 (3d Dist. 1959); Richman v. Levin,
152 Ill. App. 40 (1st Dist. 1909); Keeler v. Grace, 27 Ill. App. 427 (1st Dist. 1888).
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courts have laid down one general principle which should be used
in all cases deciding the question of procuring cause. That is: the
real estate broker, in order to earn his commission, must be the
direct and proximate cause of the transaction, and not merely the
cause of causes."
The meaning of this rule is aptly illustrated by Baumgartl v.
Hoyne.9 There, the plaintiff, a real estate broker, was employed to
sell certain land belonging to the defendant. The broker showed
the property to several persons, including a Mr. Strauss. Strauss, in
the hope of earning a commission for himself, then showed the
property to a Mr. Rosenberg, who subsequently purchased the
land and sold it to a syndicate composed of himself and several
others, some of whom had been approached at first by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff contended that he, having shown the property to
Strauss who then showed it to the ultimate purchaser, Rosenberg,
was the procuring cause of the sale.
The court, however, held that the evidence did not sustain the
plaintiff's contention. "It is the proximate cause of which the law
takes notice," said the court, "and not the causa causarum [cause of
causes] .... The proximate cause of an act is that which produces
* it without the interposition of an independent agency not the
probable result of the first cause."'" In the Baumgartl case it was
not probable that Strauss, of his own accord and for his own pur-
poses, would present the property to Rosenberg. Therefore, be-
tween all that was done by the plaintiff, and the final sale to Rosen-
berg, there intervened an entirely independent agency, the decision
of Strauss to show the property to Rosenberg in the hope of earn-
ing a commission.
BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER
Perhaps the most common means by which the real estate
broker becomes the procuring cause is that of bringing together
the parties who ultimately consummate the transaction. While the
8 Waghorne v. Hogstrom, supra note 3; Murawaka v. Boeger, supra note 3; Peek
v. Slifer, 122 Ill. App. 21 (2d Dist. 1905); Baumgartl v. Hoyne, supra note 3.
9 54 Ill. App. 497 (1st Dist. 1894).
10 Id. at 501.
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broker usually brings the parties together by personally introduc-
ing them to each other, this is not his only means."
In Adams v. Decker,12 the evidence showed that a broker
merely sent to his principal the party who ultimately purchased the
property. The court held that this evidence was sufficient to war-
rant a finding that the broker was instrumental in bringing the
parties together and was, therefore, the procuring cause of the sale.
In Cowan v. Day,'" the court went a step further, and held that
evidence that a friend of the broker, at the request of the broker,
informed the ultimate purchaser that the property was for sale,
was sufficient ground upon which to find that the broker was the
procuring cause of the sale. The court stated that, although the
broker did not personally introduce the parties, his efforts, which
brought the parties together, were, nevertheless, the procuring
cause of the sale.
Although there are no Illinois cases specifically so holding,
there are many cases which indicate that in order for the broker to
become the procuring cause, it is not necessary that he ever show the
property or that he take part in any of the negotiations. 4 However,
it has been held that where the broker had brought the parties
together, the fact that others participated in the negotiations, 15 or
that the transaction was concluded without his presence or without
his knowledge, 6 will not preclude his being the procuring cause.
CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS
On the other hand, it is entirely possible that a real estate
broker may become the procuring cause on the basis of negotia-
tions conducted by him although he had nothing to do with bring-
ing the parties together. Such a case is found in Burns v. Sullivan, 7
11 Mitchell v. Geister, 337 Ill. App. 390, 86 N.E.2d 293 (2d Dist. 1949).
12 34 Il1. App. 17 (2d Dist. 1889).
13 156 I1. App. 105 (3d Dist. 1910).
14 Glass v. Liberty Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 326 Il. App. 251, 61 N.E.2d 167 (1st Dist.
1945); Cowan v. Day, supra note 13; Adams v. Decker, supra note 12.
15 Woolf v. Hamburger, 201 Ill. App. 612 (1st Dist. 1916), where terms were not
reached until negotiations were conducted by a second broker hired by the original
broker.
16 Day v. Porter, 161 111. 235, 43 N.E. 1073 (1896); Voellinger v. Kohl, 261 Ill. App.
271 (4th Dist, 1931); Hawkins v. Taylor, 186 Ill. App. 355 (2d Dist. 1914); Pridmore v.
Wilson, 159 Il. App. 343 (1st Dist. 1911).
17 192 Ill. App. 127 (Ist Dist. 1915).
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where the plaintiff, a broker, was the first to show the property to
the purchaser and the first to introduce the purchaser to the seller.
Unable to come to terms with the seller, the purchaser began look-
ing at other property being shown by a second broker, who also
listed the seller's property. Upon hearing that the purchaser was
interested in the seller's property, the second broker re-opened
negotiations between the parties, and a sale was finally consum-
mated. The court held that it was clearly the negotiations carried
on by the second broker which brought about the sale, and that
the second broker was the procuring cause, in spite of the fact that
the plaintiff had brought the parties together.
MULTIPLE BROKERS
The Burns case also points up the proposition that where
more than one broker is employed to secure a buyer for real estate,
in the absence of a contract to the contrary,' only one commission
will become due when a purchaser has been found, and the com-
mission will be due only to the broker who can show that he was
the procuring cause of the sale. 19
In Morton v. Barney,2" the court held that where one broker
had brought about a lease for fifteen years, another broker who
had attempted to bring about a lease for ninety-nine years could
not have been the procuring cause of the lease finally consummated,
even though it was the second broker who had first made the
parties aware of each other. In so holding, the court, quoting
Whitcomb v. Bacon,2' said, "'Where several brokers have each
endeavored to bring about a sale which is finally consummated, it
may happen that each has contributed something without which
the result would not have been reached.... In such a case, in the
absence of any express contract, that one only is entitled to a
commission who can show that his services were the really effective
means of bringing about the sale.'" Quoting from Sibbald v.
18 5 I.L.P., Brokers § 80 (1953).
19 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Guild, 323 Ill. App. 608, 56 N.E.2d 659 (2d Dist. 1944);
Burns v. Sullivan, supra note 17; Morton v. Barney, 140 Ill. App. 333 (1st Dist. 1908);
Peek v. Slifer, 122 Ill. App. 21 (2d Dist. 1905).
20 Supra note 19, at 342.
21 170 Mass. 479, 482, 49 N.E. 742, 743 (1898).
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Bethlehem Co.,22 the court stated, " 'A broker is never entitled to
a commission for unsuccessful efforts.' "
The rule that the law will recognize only one procuring cause
for any single transaction apparently is based upon the premise
that although a seller hires more than one broker to obtain a buyer
for his property, he contemplates paying only one commission.
Without this rule, a seller who has hired more than one broker
might find himself subjected to suits by each broker and, ulti-
mately, might have to pay several commissions for a single sale. 3
While it might be argued that where several brokers claim the
same commission the commission might be split among them, there
seem to be no Illinois cases supporting this view. Moreover, the
Illinois courts have implemented the sole procuring cause rule by
giving the principal from whom several brokers are claiming a
commission the right to compel each of them to interplead.24
Thus, the sole procuring cause can be determined without the
principal's being subjected to two or more separate suits, each with
its own records and evidence, and thereby possibly having to
answer multiple judgments.25
It should be pointed out, however, that there are occasions
when a seller, if he is not careful, may find himself liable for more
than one commission, the sole procuring cause rule notwithstand-
ing. In Sachsel v. Farrar,26 a property owner employed two brokers
to secure a purchaser for his land. Upon the representation of one
of the brokers that he had found such a purchaser, the principal
promised to pay the commission to him. Subsequently, the other
broker claimed that he was the procuring cause of the sale and
entitled to the commission. The seller then sought to have the
brokers interplead in order to determine which broker had a right
to the commission. The court, however, held that an interpleader
action would not lie in this case. While interpleader will be
allowed where more than one broker claims to have been the
procuring cause of the sale, and, therefore, entitled to a commis-
22 83 N.Y. 378, 383 (1881).
23 Noble v. Carruthers, 235 Il1. App. 1, 8 (1st Dist. 1924) (concurring opinion).
24 Noble v. Carruthers, supra note 23; Snow v. Ulrich, 126 Ill. App. 493 (1st Dist.
1906); Sachsel v. Farrar, 35 Ill. App. 277 (lst Dist. 1889).
25 Noble v. Carruthers, supra note 23, at 8.
26 Supra note 24.
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sion, it will not be allowed where one broker claims payment
because he was the procuring cause, and the other broker claims
payment under a special agreement with the principal. Here, the
seller had bound himself to pay a commission to one of the brokers,
regardless of whether or not that broker was the procuring cause
of the sale. Thus, the other broker, if he could prove that he had
been the procuring cause of the sale, might also become entitled
to a commission, and the seller, thereby, would become liable to
each broker for a commission.
SUPPLYING INFORMATION
Illinois courts have said many times that a real estate broker
may be the procuring cause where the sale is effectuated through
information derived through him. However, it seems that in most
of the cases which so state, the broker actually did more than just
disseminate information.2 7 Glass v. Liberty Nat'l Bank of Chicago28
is an exception. In the Glass case, the broker, was one of many who
listed the seller's property. He sent to the attorney for the ultimate
purchaser, at the attorney's request, a detailed written statement
about the property. Within a week, the attorney's client, through
negotiations handled by the attorney, purchased the property.
The court, in holding that there were sufficient facts upon which
to find that the broker was the procuring cause of the sale, said
that since the buyer had acted on the basis of information his at-
torney had received from the broker, the sale was brought about
or induced through the broker by means of information derived
from him. In view of this, the fact that the broker had no contact
with the purchaser prior to the sale, that he did not introduce the
parties and that he did not take part in the negotiations, had no
effect upon his right to a commission.
ABANDONMENT
There are situations in which, regardless of how much the
broker has done to effectuate a sale of his principal's land, he will
be precluded from claiming a commission on the basis of his being
27 Read v. Tate, 20 Ill. App. 2d 147, 155 N.E.2d 377 (3d Dist. 1959), where the broker
introduced the parties; Doss v. Kirk, 8 Ill. App. 2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49 (3d Dist. 1956),
where the broker conducted negotiations.
28 326 Il. App. 251, 61 N.E.2d 167 (lst Dist. 1945).
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the procuring cause of the sale. The foremost of these situations is
that in which the broker has abandoned his efforts to bring about
the transaction, prior to its consummation.
Mammen v. Snodgrass29 offers an excellent example of such a
situation. There the broker had a non-exclusive written contract
to sell his principal's farm. He presented to his principal an offer
from the ultimate purchaser along with one hundred dollars in
earnest money. The offer was rejected by the principal. There-
after, the broker continued to show the property for about nine
months. At the end of this time, the broker informed both the
principal and the purchaser that he was leaving town for an
extended period of time. The broker returned the earnest money
to the purchaser, saying that if he was still interested in the prop-
erty, he could deal with the owner himself. The broker remained
away for two months, and two days after his return, the purchaser
and the owner concluded a sale of the property. The court reversed
a lower court's finding that the broker had been the procuring
cause of the sale. In so doing, the court stated that unsuccessful
negotiations do not form the basis for a commission where the
broker had for a long time ceased negotiations with the ultimate
purchaser, and abandoned all efforts to induce him to take the
property. "A time must necessarily arrive after a prospective pur-
chaser has declined to purchase," said the court, "when the owner
may treat the negotiations at an end and begin an entirely new
and independent solicitation."30
In the Mammen case, the length of time following the broker's
attempts to negotiate between the parties, his subsequent inac-
tivity, his returning the earnest money and his statement to the
effect that the purchaser could deal directly with the owner, all
seemed to indicate that the broker had abandoned his efforts to
29 13 I11. App. 2d 538, 142 N.E.2d 791 (3d Dist. 1957).
so Id. at 541, 142 N.E.2d at 793. For cases with similar holdings see: Kaplin v. Birk,
349 Ill. App. 538, 111 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist. 1957) where the broker was held to have
abandoned his efforts after the purchaser had said that he was no longer interested in
the property; Weisjohn v. Bell, 316 Ill. App. 62, 43 N.E.2d 688 (1st Dist. 1942) where the
seller had told the broker that she was about to close at a certain price and asked him
whether he could bring in a better offer but the broker failed to reply. Held: the broker
had abandoned his efforts to procure a buyer; Carlson v. Nathan, 43 Ill. App. 364 (1st Dist.
1891), where the broker remained inactive for one month during which the seller
negotiated a sale on his own to a prospect presented by the broker, the broker was held
to have abandoned his efforts to sell the property.
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sell the property. Thus, he could not be considered the procuring
cause of a sale arising out of later negotiations.
Exactly where the court will draw the line in deciding
whether a broker has abandoned his efforts to sell is difficult to
determine. In Doss v. Kirk,"1 where the seller had told the broker
to take the property off his list, after unsuccessful negotiations
with a party presented by the broker, and then negotiated a sale to
that party six days later, the court held the broker to have been
the procuring cause of the sale. The fact that the broker had intro-
duced the parties and that all of the information leading to the sale
had come to both parties through the efforts of the broker consti-
tuted ample evidence that the broker was the procuring cause of
the sale, notwithstanding the fact that the seller had told the
broker to take the property off his list six days prior to the sale.
A DIFFERENT TRANSACTION
Another situation in which the real estate broker cannot suc-
cessfully claim to have been the procuring cause of the transaction
is that where the transaction consummated differs substantially
from that contemplated in the contract of employment. In such
a case, it does not matter how much the broker did to bring about
the final transaction, he will not be entitled to his commission.
The case most frequently cited in support of this rule is
Morton v. Barney.82 There the broker submitted to the purchaser
an offer to sell certain unimproved land or to lease it for a term of
ninety-nine years. It was through this broker that the parties first
knew of each other. The purchaser rejected the initial offer but
subsequently leased the property for nineteen years through
another broker. Although the first broker was denied his com-
mission on several grounds, one being that he had never had a
valid contract of employment with the seller, the court stated that,
even if the broker had been under a contract with the seller, the
transaction which he attempted to negotiate was so different from
that which was ultimately consummated, that he could not have
possibly been the procuring cause of the later transaction.3 8
81 8 Ill. App. 2d 536, 132 N.E.2d 49 (3d Dist. 1956).
82 140 Ill. App. 333 (1st Dist. 1908).
83 Id. at 342.
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It has also been held that a broker under a contract to sell
land, who secures a party who enters into a contract by which he
may exercise the option of either going through with the sale or
forfeiting his initial payments, cannot be said to have been the
procuring cause of the transaction contemplated. He will be able
to claim his commission only after the payments have been made,
since only then has there been a sale.
34
Of course, where the broker's efforts have brought about a
sale, he will not be denied his commission merely because the terms
of sale vary slightly from those contemplated in the contract of
employment. 5
Thus, in Lawrence v. Atwood,36 a broker employed to sell
certain land at ten thousand dollars down and the balance in two
notes of ten thousand dollars each, was held to have been the
procuring cause of a sale for one thousand dollars down and the
balance in three notes of ten thousand dollars apiece. The court
said that because the broker was the procuring cause of the sale,
he was entitled to his commission, and the fact that the sale was on
terms slightly different from those originally envisioned was not
material.3 7
Such a rule is, of course, necessary in order to protect the
broker who has been the procuring cause of the sale from the loss
of his commission in a situation where the parties alter the terms
slightly, and then claim that the broker did not procure the trans-
action contemplated in his employment contract.
R. PECK
34 Lawrence v. Rhodes, 87 111. App. 672 (1st Dist. 1899), rev'd on other grounds, 188
Ill. 96, 58 N.E. 910 (1900); Murawaka v. Boeger, 219 Ill. App. 241 (1st Dist. 1920).
35 Read v. Tate, 20 Ill. App. 2d 147, 155 N.E.2d 377 (3d Dist. 1959); Mammen v.
Snodgrass, 13 Ill. App. 2d 538, 142 N.E.2d 791 (3d Dist. 1957); McConaughy v. Mahannah,
28 Ill. App. 169 (2d Dist. 1888); Lawrence v. Atwood, 1 Ill. App. 217 (1st Dist. 1878).
36 1 111. App. 217 (1st Dist. 1878).
37 Id. at 222.
